Capital Gains: Rates Realizations and Revenues by Lawrence B. Lindsey
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
CAPITAL GAINS:
RATES REALIZATIONS AND REVENUES
Larry Lindsey
Working Paper No. 1893




The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
inTaxation and projects -in Government Budgets and Taxation and
CapitalFormation. Any opinions expressed arethose of the author




Thispaper examines the effect of capital gains tax rates on
the level of capital gains realizations and the resulting amount
of tax revenues. It concludes that capital gains tax revenues
are maximized at a rate at the current 20 percent rate or lower,
with a central estimate of 16 percent. Some of any gain in
revenue due to a rate reduction is likely to be temporary, but
the data suggest that even in the long run about 5.4 percent
more capital gains will be realized for every one percentage
point reduction in the capital gains tax rate.
The study uses detailed tabulation data of personal income
tax returns for the period 1965—82. It carefully estimates the
effect of a number of tax provisions on the marginal tax rate on
capital gainsThese include the Alternative Tax Computation,
Additional Minimum Tax, Maximum Tax on Earned Income, and the
Alternative Minimum Tax. In many cases these special provisions
had unintended consequences.
Household wealth data is used to estimate the stock of
unrealized capital gains in taxpayer's portfolios. The study
finds a significant difference:between tradeable assets such as
real estate and common stock, and non—traded forms of household
wealth such as cash and checking accounts. As expected, capital
gains realizations closely track changes in traded wealth but
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The effect of the capital gains tax on the sale of capital
assets and the realization of gains on these assets has been a
matter of substantial academic and political controversy.
Capital gains are only taxed when an asset is sold, so inclusion
of gains in taxable income is largely discretionary from the
point of view of the taxpayer. As a result, sensitivity to tax
rates is probably greater for capital gains income than for
other kinds of income.
This sensitivity may take a number of forms. Capital gains
and losses on assets held for less than a specified time period,
currently 6 months, are taxed as ordinary income while gains and
losses on assets held for longer periods of time are taxed at
lower rates. Within limits specified by the tax law, taxpayers
have an incentive to realize losses in the short term and gains
in the long term. Planning of sales around this capital gains
holding period was studied by Kaplan (1981), who concluded that
eliminating the distinction between long term and short term
gains, and taxing all assets under current long term rules,
would enhance capital gains tax revenue. Fredland, Gray, and
Sunley (1968) also found that the length of the holding period
had a significant effect on the timing of asset sales.
*AssistantProfessor of Economics, Harvard University and
Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research.
I wish to thank Martin Feldstein and Emil Sunley for their
thoughtful insights and Andrew Mitrusi and Alex Wong for their
assistance in this research.—2—
The deferral of taxes on capital gains until realization
enhances the incentive to postpone selling assets. A taxpayer
might defer selling one asset and purchasing another with a
higher pre-tax return because capital gains tax on the sale
makes the transaction unprofitable. This is known as the
"lock-in' effect. Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki (1980)
estimated that the effect of lock—in was substantial enough to
suggest that a reduction in tax rates from their 1978 levels
would increase tax revenue. Their study focussed on sales of
common stock using 1973 tax return data. The results mirrored
those of an earlier work by Feldstein and Yitzhaki (1977) which
relied on data from the 1963-64 Federal Reserve Board Survey of
the Financial Characteristics of Consumers.
Brannon (1974) found evidence of reduced realizations of
capital gains as a result of tax rate increases in 1970 and
1971. A lock in effect was also identified by Auten (1979).
Later work by Auten and Clotfelter (1979) found a substantially
greater sensitivity of capital gains realizations to short term
fluctuations in the tax rate than to long term, average tax rate
levels. Minarik (1981) studied the lock in effect and concluded
that a one percent reduction in the capital gains tax rate would
increase realizations, but by substantially less than one
percent. The Department of the Treasury (1985) released a
report to the Congress which presented substantially higher—3—
estimates of the elasticity of capital gains realizations to tax
rates and concluded that the tax rate reductions of 1978 had the
effect of increasing capital gains tax revenue.
Some work has also been done on incentives to lock in
capital gains for very long periods of time. Assets held until
death or contributed to charity escape capital gains taxation
under the income tax. In the case of death, capital gains are
taxed by the estate tax since estates are subject to estate
taxes on the full fair market value of the assets they contain.
Bailey (1969) and David (1968) have argued that eliminating
these provisions would be an efficient means of reducing the
lock-in effect by eliminating the possibility of escaping
capital gains tax.
The objective of the present paper is to examine the
relationship among capital gains tax rates, the level of
realizations of long term gains subject to tax, and revenues
from capital gains taxation over an extended period of time.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 began an era of high variability in
the capital gains tax rate which had been relatively constant
for the preceding 15 years. Further changes in the tax reform
bills of 1976, 1978, and 1981 continued this variability.
The changes in the effective capital gains tax rate which
resulted from these laws were quite complex and often involved
the interaction of several provisions. This paper makes careful
estimates of the effective marginal tax rate on capital gains
for various income groups over the period 1965—82. These
detailed estimates suggest smaller variability in rates than
suggested by the maximum effective rates cited in other studies.—4—
The first section describes the computation of the effective
capital gains tax rates and describes the impact of the various
provisions on the capital gains tax rate. The effect of these
provisions is combined using detailed tabulation data from the
Statistics of Income to estimate average marginal effective tax
rates for various income groups.
The second section analyzes data from the sector balance
sheets and reconciliation statements of the Federal Reserve
Board's Flow of Funds series. These data provide estimates of
the level and composition of wealth of the household sector.
They also estimate the change in value of these holdings due to
movements in asset prices. This section also describes the
method used to allocate these wealth values among the various
income classes studied.
The final section combines the data on the level and
distribution of wealth with the marginal tax rate series to
estimate the effect of marginal tax rates on the rate of
realization. These parameter estimates are then placed in the
context of a revenue maximizing objective function to calculate
the capital gains tax rate that produces the maximum revenue for
the government. The sensitivity of these estimates to
econometric specification is also examined in the final section.—5—
I.Capital Gains Tax Rates
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 distinguished between
gains on assets held at least 6 months and those held longer.
The former were taxed as ordinary income while the latter,
termed long term gains, were given a 50 percent exclusion from
taxable income. However, this exclusion was limited to net
capital gains; long term gains in excess of short term losses.
Therefore, to the extent that long term gains simply cancelled
short term losses, the long term marginal tax rate equalled the
short term rate, which was the same as the tax rate on ordinary
income. (There were some exceptions to this tax treatment
including S.1231 gains. These gains received capital gains
treatment if positive but ordinary income treatment if
negative.)
There remains some debate regarding the proper measure of
capital gains for analysis. Minarik (1983) has argued that long
term gains in excess of any short term loss is the only relevant
measure of gains for considering the effect of tax rates and
revenue implications. On the other hand, some analyses of
capital gains, such as that by Feldstein and Slemrod (1982)
have included net long term capital losses in their
calculation. These net losses are permitted only limited
deductibility in the year taken, although they may be carried
forward to offset future tax liability. In general, their
inclusion would tend to decrease the apparent effectiveness of
capital gains taxation in generating revenue and raise the
apparent sensitivity of taxpayers to capital gains tax rates.—6—
Poterba (1985) examined 1982 tax return data and found that
taxpayers with net long term gains comprised the majority of all
returns reporting capital gains or losses. He noted, however,
that a sizable fraction of taxpayers were subject to the capital
loss limitation and therefore could realize additional long term
gains without incurring any additional current tax liability.
These taxpayers are unaffected by the marginal tax rate on
capital gains, generate no capital gains tax liability, and are
therefore neglected in the present study.
The present study examines only long term gains in excess of
short term losses. The relevant marginal tax rate for most
taxpayers is therefore half the tax rate on ordinary income as
only half of such gains are included in taxable income.(After
October 31, 1978 this inclusion rate was reduced to 40
percent.) The higher tax rate on inframarginal long term gains
used to offset short term losses is neglected. We consider only
the tax rate on marginal realizations of long term gains for
taxpayers with long term gains in excess of short term losses.
Although the general rule for tax rates on long term gains
is that they are half of ordinary rates (40 percent of ordinary
rates after October 31, 1978), there are a number of other
provisions of the tax code which affected the capital gains tax
rate. These include the Alternative Tax Computation, the
Additional Minimum Tax, the Maximum Tax on Personal Service
Income, and the Alternative Minimum Tax. We consider each in
turn, using detailed tabulation data from the Statistics of
Income to calculate its effect on capital gains tax rates.—7--.
The Alternative
Tax rates on ordinary income over most of the period of this
study ranged up to 70 percent. Thus, taxation of long term
gains at half the ordinary rate would produce a maximum tax rate
of 35 percent. However, a special provision, the Alternative
Tax Computation, permitted the taxpayer to limit the marginal
tax rate on at least some of his capital gains to 25 percent.
Although generally described as having "effectively truncated
the tax rate schedule"1, careful analysis of the data suggests
that this was not the case. This section describes the
operation and limitations of the Alternative Tax Computation.
Prior to 1970, taxpayers were allowed to choose one of two
tax computation methods. The first, called the regular method,
involved using the ordinary tax rate schedule to compute tax on
the taxpayer's total amount of taxable income including taxable
capital gains. The second, called the Alternative Tax
Computation, involved using the ordinary tax rate schedule to
compute the tax on non—capital gains income plus paying tax
equal to 50 percent of the taxable portion of capital gains. As
only half of long term gains are taxable, the effective tax rate
becomes 25 percent.
Figure 1 shows how the Alternative Tax Computation should
work. The figure plots taxable income along the horizontal axis
and marginal tax rate along the vertical axis. The tax code
exhibits the upward sloping form shown with the normal tax
liability represented by the area of the triangle. In this
case, the taxpayer's other income is sufficient to get him overFigure 1




the 50 percent bracket amount, and he pays tax liability
indicated by area A on his ordinary income. In addition, the
taxpayer pays 50 percent on the included portion of capital
gains. This is indicated by area B. The total tax saving to
this taxpayer from the alternative tax computation is area C,
and his marginal tax rate on capital gains is limited to 25
percent.
Now consider the case shown in Figure 2. Here, the
taxpayer's total taxable income is enough to be taxed at a rate
over 50 percent, but his non-capital gains income is not. The
taxpayer has a choice. He can elect to be taxed under the
regular tax rate schedule, in which case his tax liability is
the large triangle ,orhe can elect the alternative tax
computation. If he chooses the alternate tax computation, tax
is levied by the ordinary schedule on his non-capital gains
income, equal to area D. In addition, he pays tax at a 50
percent rate on the included portion of capital gains, indicated
by areas E and F. As area E indicates, a portion of the
taxpayer's long term gains are taxed at a rate higher than they
would be under the normal tax rate schedule. This taxpayer
elects the alternative tax computation only if it results in a
tax savings. In this case, such a situation results only if
area E is less than area G.
Consider a taxpayer situation where this is the case. The
taxpayer realizes long term gains of $200,000 and has other
income of $50,000. In addition, he has itemized deductions of
$40,000. The taxpayer excludes half of the long term gains fromFigure 2




tax, leaving an Adjusted Gross Income of $150,000, and then
subtracts itemized deductions to produce a taxable income of
$110,000. Using the tax schedule of the era (1965-1969), the
ordinary tax computation would produce a tax liability of
$51,380. Under the alternative tax computation, he would pay
ordinary tax on the first $10,000, equal to $1,820, plus a 50
percent tax on the $100,000 of included gains, producing a total
tax liability of $51,820.
This taxpayer would elect to be taxed under the ordinary
schedule as it produces a lower tax liability. However, the
marginal tax rate under this schedule is 62 percent, producing a
marginal tax rate on capital gains of 31 percent. In this case,
the alternative tax computation did not effectively limit the
tax rate on long term gains to 25 percent. An effective tax
rate limit of 25 percent would require that the last $25,000 of
included capital gains be taxed at 50 percent, rather than the
first $25,000.
Although a majority of taxpayers in upper income brackets
who realized long term gains did avail themselves of the
alternative tax computation method, a signficant fraction did
not. For example, in 1966, of 27,766 taxpayers with Adjusted
Gross Incomes between $100,000 and $200,000, more than one
quarter did not elect the alternative tax computation. The same
was true for 16 percent of taxpayers with Adjusted Gross Incomes
between $200,000 and $500,000 with net long term capital gains,
and for 7.5 percent of taxapayers in the same situation with
Adjusted Gross Income over $500,0002.— 10—
Thedata are not sufficient to indicate the reason why these
taxpayers elected the ordinary tax computation. It should be
noted, however, that taxpayers are less likely to chose the
alternative tax computation as long term gains rise as a share
of income. An extreme example would be a taxpayer with negative
ordinary taxable Income but large amounts of positive capital
gains. This could be due to net operating losses in a business
or partnership or to itemized deductions such as state taxes,
interest, and charitable contributions, exceeding his ordinary
income. The ordinary tax computation effectively permits this
taxpayer to shelter that portion of his long term gain which
offsets the negative part of his ordinary taxable income .But,
under the alternative tax computation, the tax on this negative
portion of income would be zero, while the tax on the included
portion of capital gains would be at the full 50 percent rate.
Thus, in certain situations, taxpayers with a substantial
capital gain may still find themselves excluded from the
alternate tax computation. The effect of this on the average
marginal tax rate on taxpayers with net long term gains was an
increase of 1.5 percentage points above the 25 percent
theoretical maximum for taxpayers in the $100,000 to $500,000
income range.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the alternative tax
computation by limiting the 25 percent rate to a maximum of
$50,000 in net long term gains.Thus, only $25,000 of the
included half of long term gains qualified for the "special" 50
percent rate. In 1970, the excess over this amount was taxed— 11—
ata maximum rate of 59 percent. This maximum tax rate was
raised to 65 percent in 1971 and the limit was removed
completely in 1972 and later years.
The actual alternative tax computation was constructed to
minimize the potential benefits to the taxpayer. Figure 3 shows
the method of computation for a taxpayer who would receive some
benefit from the computation. The tax owed was comprised of
three parts. The first part, denoted as area H, was the tax
owed on the taxpayer's ordinary taxable income. This
corresponds to area A in Figure 1. The second part, denoted as
area I, was a 50 percent tax on the first $25,000 of the
included portion of capital gains. If the included portion of
the taxpayer's gains was less than $25,000, then the effective
marginal tax rate on these gains was 25 percent, and no further
computation is necessary. If capital gains exceeded $25,000
then the tax computation included a third part, denoted as area
J. This was the difference between (a) the tax calculated using
the ordinary computation on the taxpayer's total taxable income
and (b) the tax calculated using the ordinary computation on the
sum of $25,000 plus the taxpayer's non-capital gains taxable
income.
If the taxpayer did not elect the alternative tax
computation, his tax would have been the total area under the
ordinary tax schedule, denoted as areas H, I, .1, and K. The net
tax savings to the taxpayer was therefore area K. Note that for
any taxpayer with more than $25,000 of included capital gains,
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beenhad their been no alternative tax computation. Thus, to
the extent that capital gains realizations are based on marginal
incentives, the alternative tax computation had no effect on a
substantial number of taxpayers. Table 1 provides estimates of
the revenue loss from this provision of an inframarginal tax
reduction to recipients of capital gains.
The change in the alternative tax computation to limit
special treatment to only $25,000 of included gains also had the
effect of lowering the fraction of taxpayers electing the
alternative computation, even among taxpayers with more than
$25,000 of capital gains. Figure 4 shows a taxpayer situation
in which it may not be in the interest of the taxpayer to elect
the alternative tax computation. The taxpayer must pay tax
above the statutory rate on a portion of his gains in the hopes
that this will offset a lower rate on some of the rest of his
gains. This taxpayer would owe tax equal to areas L, M, N, and
0. Under the ordinary tax computation he would owe taxes on L,
M, 0, and P. The taxpayer thus elects the alternative tax
computation only if area N is smaller than area P.
The effect of this change in the alternative computation was
to limit the marginal incentive to a minority of taxpayers in
income groups with high marginal rates. Table 2 shows the
fraction of taxpayers in high income groups with net long term
capital gains who did not receive a marginal benefit from the
alternative tax computation and the reason why. In only one
income group in one year did a majority receive a marginal rate
reduction.— 13—
Thereare two reasons for this ineffectiveness. First, it
was impossible for any taxpayer with more than $25,000 in gains
to benefit at the margin. Second, taxpayers with relatively
small amounts of non—capital gains taxable income would also not
benefit regardless of the size of their capital gains income.
This limited alternative tax computation was therefore of
marginal benefit only to taxpayers with relatively small amounts
of capital gains income and relatively large amounts of other
income. However, as noted above, much of the effect was infra-
marginal with regard to taxpayer decision making, while costing
significant amounts of revenue.
The Additional Minimum Tax
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 began the Additional Tax for Tax
Preferences, also known as the minimum tax. The excluded
portion of capital gains was among a list of 9 types of income,
termed preferences, which came under the minimum tax. The
additional minimum tax was levied in two forms, one from 1970
through 1975, and one from 1976 through 1978. We consider each
in turn.
The early form of the tax was levied at a 10 percent rate on
the items of tax preference reduced by an exclusion of $30,000
plus the taxpayer's ordinary tax liability and some other
deductions discussed later. The effect of this was to make the
taxpayer's additional tax rate negatively related to his
ordinary tax rate. In the case of the capital gains tax
preference, the additional tax rate was negatively related to— 14—
theeffective capital gains tax rate. This was truewhether the
taxpayer elected the alternative orthe regular method of tax
computation.
Consider a taxpayer with substantial preference incomewho
realizes an additional dollar of net long term capital gains.
The excluded portion of the gains, 50 cents, entersthe minimum
tax base as a tax preference. This 50 cents isoffset by the
amount the taxpayer's ordinary tax liabilityincreased. This
ordinary tax liability is increased by the remainingpart of the
capital gain, which is taxed either at the ordinaryrate, or at
50 percent if the alternative tax computation iseffective.
Thus, the higher ordinary tax liability iseither half the
taxpayer's ordinary tax rate or 25 cents forthe alternative
tax. So, the 50 cent increase in capital gains preferencecould
be offset by a 25 percent ordinary capital gains taxrate,
raising the additional tax base by 25 cents onnet. The 10
percent additional tax rate is applied tothe net increase in
the tax base, raising his marginal tax rate on theadded dollar
of capital gain by 2.5 cents.
If, on the other hand, the effective tax rate on capital
gains is 35 percent, the minimum tax basewould only rise by 15
cents for every dollar of long term gains realized.The
additional minimum tax in this situation would only be1.5
percentage points. Figure 5 shows therelationship between the
marginal tax rate on the included portionof capital gains and
the additional tax rate.TABLE 2














































ORDINARY INCOMEFIRST $25000 EXCESS
CAPITAL GAINS— 15—
Theadditional minimum tax had a feature which reduced its
effectiveness over time. Taxpayers were allowed to carryover
from any year after 1970 the excess of ordinary tax over net
preferences and apply the carryforward against the current
yeares net tax preferences. For example, suppose a taxpayer had
ordinary tax liability of $50,000 in 1971 and tax preferences in
the same year, after the $30,000 exclusion, of $40,000. He owed
no minimum tax because his ordinary tax liability exceeded his
preferences by $10,000. That $10,000 could be carried over to
1972 to offset his tax preferences in that year. So, if he had
a $30,000 ordinary tax liability in 1972 and $40,000 in
preferences after the exclusion, he would owe no minimum tax in
1972 either. Taxes in excess of preferences could be carried
over for up to 7 years to reduce the future effect of the
minimum tax.
Table 3 shows the effect of the additional minimum tax on
the marginal tax rate on capital gains. The effect of the
carryforward is clearly evident. In 1970, taxpayers in the
$200,000 —$500,000income class faced an increased marginal tax
rate on capital gains of 1.18 percentage points as a result of
the additional minimum tax. By 1975, the effect of the
additonal minimum tax on the average marginal tax rate on
capital gains was only 0.24 percentage points, or about 80
percent less. The reason for this was that substantial numbers
of taxpayers had amassed carryforwards sufficient to exempt them
from the minimum tax. In 1970, some 62 percent of all








0% ORDINARY INCOME TAX RATE 70%TABLE 3
Percentage Point Increase in Capital Gains Rate
Due to the Additional Minimum Tax
Income Class
$50,000— $100,000—$200,000— $500,000 over
Year $1 00000 $200, 000 $SOQLQOOi1OQ00000000O
1970 0.28 0.75 1.18 1.47 1.65
1971 0.08 0.26 0.58 0.98 1.27
1972 0.07 0.22 0.51 0.80 1.15
1973 0.06 0.20 0.42 0.72 1.02
1974 0.04 0.15 0.30 0.54 0.75
1975 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.45 1.08
1976 1.04 1.56 1.96 2.70 3.08
1977 1.37 1.72 2.21 3.75 4.62
1978 1.35 1.69 1.87 2.34 2.66— 16—
$500,000paid some additional tax. By 1975, only 13 percent of
capital gains recipients in the same income category paidthe
additional tax.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 made substantial changes in the
minimum tax which greatly increased its scope. The carryforward
from previous years was ended altogether. Two additional
preferences were added, one for intangible drilling costsand
one for itemized deductions in excess of 60 percent of Adjusted
Gross Income. The tax rate was raised to 15 percent and the
exclusion lowered to the greater of $10,000 or one half of
ordinary tax liability. The IRS estimates3 that this resulted
in an eleven fold increase in the number of taxpayers paying the
minimum tax and a six fold increase in minimum tax revenues.
The 1976 changes in the minimum tax raised the average
effective tax rate on capital gains in two ways. First, it
increased the number of taxpayers subject to the additional levy
of the minimum tax, as the above figures indicate. Second, it
increased the addition to the effective tax rate caused by the
minimum tax for each minimum taxpayer. Figure 6 illustrates how
this new minimum tax affected the marginal tax rate on capital
gains.
If a taxpayer received an additional dollar of net long term
capital gains, the 50 cents excluded from the ordinary tax was
treated as a tax preference. The remaining 50 cents raised the
ordinary tax the taxpayer paid. Half of the increase in
ordinary tax was used as an offset against preference income







So,if the taxpayer were In the 50 percent tax bracket, the
additional dollar of capital gains would raise his ordinary
taxes by 25 cents and his offset by 12.5 cents. In this case,
the taxpayer's additional minimum tax base would rise by 37.5
cents. This base is taxed at a 15 percent rate, meaning that
the taxes paid on the additional dollar of capital gains Is
increased by 5.625 cents.
As was the case before 1976, the additional taxes paid fall
as the taxpayer's ordinary marginal tax rate rises. If a
taxpayer's ordinary tax rate was 70 percent and the alternative
tax computation was not effective at the margin, the ordinary
tax would rise by 35 cents for every dollar of capital gains
realized. This would mean a 17.5 cent offset against the
additional 50 cents in tax preferences. The resulting 32.5 cent
Increase in the minimum tax base means that the minimum tax
raised the effective tax rate on capital gains by 4.875 cents.
The additional tax had its greatest effect on the marginal
tax rate on capital gains in 1977. In that year it raised the
average capital gains rate in the top bracket by 4.6 percentage
points. Some 92 percent of capital gains recipients with AGI
over $1,000,000 were subject to the additional minimum tax in
that year. The effect of the additional tax was much less in the
top brackets In 1978. In that year only 52 percent of the
recipients of capital gains in the over $1,000,000 income group
paid additional tax. The reason for this is probably the tax
legislation which moved through Congress that year. The
additional minimum tax was eliminated beginning in January,— 18—
1979.Tax conscious investors may well have postponed their
realizations to take account of this (and other) changes in the
tax law which had the effect of lowering the capital gains tax
rate.
The additional minimum tax interacted with other provisions
of the tax code. As already noted, taxpayers electing the
alternative tax computation would face higher additional minimum
taxes on their capital gains than taxpayers who computed their
tax according to the regular tax rate schedule. The additional
minimum tax also interacted with the Maximum Tax on Personal
Service Income in a manner which increased the effective tax
rate on capital gains income.
Maximum Tax on Personal Service Income
The Maximum Tax on Personal Service Income, otherwise known
as the "maximum tax" was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969. Its objective was to reduce the effective tax rate on
wage, salary, and professional income below that on other types
of income. Instead of the statutory 70 percent top rate, the
top rate on personal service income was set at 60 percent in
1971 and 50 percent thereafter. As Lindsey (1981) showed, the
maximum tax was ineffective at achieving these objectives for
the vast majority of high income taxpayers. However, a complex
interaction between the maximum tax and other provisions of the
tax law had the effect of raising the effective capital gains
tax rate for many taxpayers.— 19—
Between1971 and 1976, every dollar of preference income in
excess of the additional tax exclusion (see above section)
reduced the amount of earned income eligible for the lower rate
by one dollar. In effect, every dollar of capital gains
received over a certain threshold converted 50 cents of earned
income into unearned income for purposes of the maximum tax. As
the tax rate on earned income could be as low as 50 percent and
the tax rate on unearned income as high as 70 percent, this had
the effect of adding as much as 10 percent to the effective
capital gains tax rate. This interaction between capital gains
and the maximum tax is known as "poisoning".
During this era there were two types of maximum tax
"poisoning" caused by the receipt of capital gains. The first
type, described above, involved the receipt of preference income
above a threshold. The second involved an absolute limit on the
amount of income eligible for treatment as earned income. This
limit equalled taxable income minus the included portion of
capital gains. Consider an example. A taxpayer has $200,000 in
earned income and a total capital gain of $300,000 of which 50
percent, or $150,000 is included in income making AGI a totalof
$350,000. The taxpayer has itemized deductions of $100,000.
Therefore, the taxpayer's taxable income is $250,000. This
second type of poisoning would limit the amount of income
eligible for earned income treatment to $100,000, or taxable
income less the included portion of capital gains.
The actual interaction of capital gains and the maximum tax
is quite complex. This complexity would generally produce a— 20—
rateof "poisoning" slightly lower than that described above.
The amount of income eligible for treatment as earned income,
known as Earned Taxable Income (ETI) is given by the following
formula:
(1) ETI =(PSINC/AGI)X TAXINC -PREFERENCES
In this equation PSINC, or personal service income, equals
income from wages, salaries, and professional income. TAXINC,
or taxable income, is apportioned between earned and unearned
portions according to the share of AGI contributed by PSINC.
Earned Taxable Income is then reduced by the amount of
preference income, including the excluded portion of capital
gains. This latter substraction represents the "poisioning"
effect described above.
However, the derivative of earned taxable income with
respect to a change in capital gains shows that there is a an
offset to this poisoning as well:
(2) dETI =0.5PS CjAGI-TAXINCj -0.5
dCAPGN AGI2— 21—
Usingthe chain rule and the fact that an additional dollar of
capital gains realizations increases AGI, TAXINC, and
PREFERENCES by 50 cents each, we find that the change in ETI f or
a change in capital gains depends on the ratios of taxable
income and personal service income to AGI. Most important is
the fact that taxable income is less than AGI. Therefore, the
term in parentheses is positive. This in turn implies that
earned taxable income falls by less than the 50 cent change in
preferences when capital gains increase. So, the interaction of
the maximum tax and capital gains realizations means that the
taxpayer was poisoned, but also received a partial antidote.
The effect described by equation 2 was designed to allocate
personal exemptions and itemized deductions between earned and
other income. Moving a dollar of earned income into the
unearned category will shift this allocation of personal
exemptions and itemized deductions, providing the partially
offsetting effect. However, this "partial antidote" was only
effective if the taxpayer had preference income in excess of the
preference exclusion. It was not effective in cases where the
taxpayer's earned taxable income was more than his taxable
income less included capital gains.
In 1977 the scope of poisoning was increased. Beginning in
that year, all preference income regardless of source was used
to offset earned taxable income whether or not it exceeded the
preference exclusion of the additional tax. Thus, althoughthis
change had no effect on the marginal capital gains tax rateof a
"poisoned" taxpayer, the number of taxpayers who were poisoned
was increased.TABLE 4
Percentage Point Increase in Capital Gains Tax Rate
Due to the Effect of the Maximum Tax
____ ____IncomeClass ______
$50,000- $100,000- over
Year 4Q0L0O0 200 000 20000O
1971 0.01 0.07 0.18
1972 0.04 0.28 0.66
1973 0.07 0.34 0.75
1974 0.04 0.34 0.89
1975 0.04 0.32 1.02
1976 0.03 0.34 1.25
1977 0.27 2.25 3.70
1978 0.30 2.45 4.10— 22—
Table4 presents calculations of the percentage point
increase in the effective tax rate on capital gains due to the
poisoning effect of the maximum tax.The effect of the 1977
changes is clear. In 1976, taxpayers in the $100,000 —$200,000
income group had average marginal tax rates raised 0.34
percentage points by the maximum tax. In 1977, this jumped six
fold to 2.25 percentage points. Poisoning of the maximum tax
was eliminated beginning in 1979 as a part of the Tax Reform
Bill of 1978.
Alternative Minimum_Tax
The Tax Reform Act of 1978 removed capital gains from the
list of preferences subject to the additional minimum tax
beginning in 1979. Instead, an alternative minimum tax was
established which combined the excluded portion of capital
gains, itemized deductions in excess of 60 percent of AGI and
the taxpayerts regular taxable income in its base. Taxes were
levied at graduated rates of 10, 20, and 25 percent on this
alternative tax base. The taxpayer paid the greater of his
regular tax liability or his alternative tax liability.
Since the full amount of capital gains was in the
alternative tax base, these three rates became the effective
tax rate on capital gains for taxpayers who paid the alternative
tax. These tax rates are generally lower than the ordinary
capital gains which could be as high as 28 percent, so the— 23—
alternativeminimum tax had the effect of lowering the marginal
tax rate on capital gains, even though the average tax rate paid
by alternative minimum taxpayers was increased by the provision.
Nearly all alternative minimum taxpayers with AGI over
$200,000 paid taxes at the 25 percent effective tax rate.In
the $100,000 —$200,000income class this fell to about three
fourths of taxpayers paying the alternative minimum tax, with
the average alternative minimum rate in this group at 23.6
percent. The average rate was only 17.6 percent in the $50,000
—$100,000income group.
The net result of the alternative minimum tax was to reduce
the average marginal tax rate on capital gains in the top income
groups by about one percentage point in 1979, and about 0.4
percentage points in 1980. But, because the top regular capital
gains rate averaged 24 percent in 1981, the effect of the
minimum tax was to increase the average marginal tax rate by
about 0.2 percentage points that year. Other income groups had
tax rate changes of about 0.2 percentage points as a result of
the alternative minimum tax.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 eliminated the 25
percent tax bracket on the Alternative Minimum Tax. This meant
that beginning in 1982, alternative minimum taxpayers faced the
same effective tax rate on capital gains as ordinary taxpayers
——20percent.— 24—
Combined_Effects
Table 5 presents calculations of the average effective tax
rate faced by taxpayers with net long term gains in excess of
short term losses. The calculations were based on the tax
computation status of taxpayers with such gains as reported in
the Statistics onc. The calculations weighted all
taxpayers equally within a given income class in order to
minimize the simultaneity between the tax rate and the level of
realizations. The tax rate estimates include the effects of the
interactions between the various types of taxation described in
this section.
Also included in the tax rate estimates are the effects of
the changes in the exclusion rate in the 1978 tax bill and the
maximum capital gains rate in the 1981 tax bill. The 1978 act
increased the rate of exclusion of net long term gains from 50
percent to 60 percent for all assets sold after October 31,
1978. The figures for 1978 therefore take a weighted average of
tax rates implied by the two exclusion rates in proportion to
the fraction of the year each exclusion rate was in effect. In
other words, a weight of .833 was attached to the rates
applicable to a 50 percent exclusion and a weight of .167 was
attached to the rates applicable to a 60 percent exlcusion.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the maximum
tax rate on capital gains to 20 percent for all assets sold
after June 9, 1981. The 1981 rates therefore reflect a weightedTABLE 5








1965 11.1 25.5 26.5 26.6 26.0 25.3
1966 11.1 25.5 26.5 26.6 26.0 25.3
1967 12.5 25.5 26.5 26.6 26.0 25.3
1968 13.4 27.4 28.4 28.5 27.9 27.1
1969 13.8 28.0 29.0 29.1 28.5 27.7
1970 12.9 27.8 30.5 32.2 32.1 32.0
1971 12.5 26.3 29.1 32.0 33.3 33.9
1972 12.5 26.6 28.7 32.5 33.9 34.6
1973 12.5 26.6 28.9 32.8 34.3 35.0
1974 12.0 26.3 28.9 32.6 33.6 34.4
1975 11.6 26.3 28.8 32.5 33.5 34.7
1976 11.5 27.2 29.9 34.0 36.1 37.3
1977 10.8 27.8 31.7 36.3 39.2 41.2
1978 10.6 27.8 32.2 36.3 37.9 39.1
1979 10.6 19.4 25.3 27.3 27.0 26.9
1980 10.6 19.5 25.4 27.6 27.6 27.6
1981 10.8 19.1 22.9 24.1 24.2 24.2
1982 11.2 17.6 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0— 25—
averageof rates which ranged up to the old maximumof 28
percent for half the year and 20 percentfor the other half the
year. In this case, equal weightswere attached to the two tax
rate scenarios.
The data show that the maximum capital gainstax rate
increased rapidly between 1967 and 1977 anddecreased rapidly
thereafter. These data provide a significantamount of variance
in the tax rate term. The next sectiondescribes how these data
were combined with data on wealth toestimate the sensitivity of
taxpayers to changes in the capital gainstax rate.TABLE 6





















Thelevel of capital gains realizations has trended upward
throughout the period of this study, 1965-1982. Table 6
presents the nominal value of net long term capital gains
realizations in each of the 18 years encompassed by this study.
Net long term realizations in 1982 were more than 4 times their
1965 level. In 13 of the 18 years capital gains were higher
than in the preceding year.
This general upward trend was marked by a number of
discontinuities. Capital gains in 1969 and 1970 were well below
the values of 1968. Net realizations were also lower in 1974
and 1975 than In 1973. 1969 and 1970 were associated with
higher tax rates than preceding years due to the Vietnam War
surtax. 1970 was associated with a decline in the stock market.
1974 and 1975 were also associated with a declining stock
market.
On the other hand, very rapid growth in capital gains
realizations occurred between 1978 and 1979. Net long term
gains in 1979 were 45 percent greater than in 1978. 1979 was
associated with only a very modest advance in stock prices,
however. The sharp decline in capital gains tax rates appears
to be a primary factor in this advance in realizations. Capital
gains realizations in 1978 may also have been depressed in
anticipation of the cuts in 1979, increasing the apparent
percentage rise in realizations.— 27—
Thedebate over the importance of capital gains rates in
determining realizations is complicated by changes in the value
of personal wealth including accrued but unrealized capital
gains. The objective of this section is to estimate values for
personal wealth holdings in order to control for this factor in
determining the role that capital gains tax rates play in
realizations.
The Federal Reserve Board issues a quarterly Flow of Funds
report on the holdings of various sectors of the U.S. economy.
These figures contain detailed balance sheets and reconciliation
statements for the asset holdings of households, government, and
corporations. The present study uses the values of wealth
holdings by households.
The components of household wealth include many elements on
which households either cannot or probably will not realize
capital gains. For example, holdings of cash, checking and
savings deposits do not include the possibility of capital
gains. Capital gains accruing to households via financial
intermediaries such as life insurance and pension funds are also
not reported as capital gains when the taxpayer files his tax
return. Capital gains in pension funds, including IRA and Keogh
accounts, are reported as pension income when the funds are
dispersed after retirement.
We therefore chose to divide household wealth into two
components: those readily tradeable and subject to potential
capital gains realizations, and those unlikely to be subject to
such realizations. This section considers each in turn.— 28—
TradeableWealth
Tradeable wealth is comprised of those assets on which
capital gains are regularly realized. TheInternal Revenue
Service has tabulated the distribution of capital gains by type
of asset. Table 7 provides the percentage breakdownof sales of
capital assets by the number of transactionsand the value of
net gains. The data show that sales of corporatestock, real
estate, and capital gains income which passes throughto the
individual taxpayer from small business corporations
proprietorships1 and partnerships comprise some97 percent of
the value of net capital gains.
In the context of the data in the Flow of Funds,these
categories include land, residential structures, corporate
equities, and equity in non-corporate businesses.This latter
category includes the value of non—residentialreal estate held
by households. Tangible assets such as consumerdurables on
which capital gains are rarely reported, were excludedfrom this
study.
These traded assets have tended to comprise about twothirds
of all household wealth over the period studied. Thisshare
varied from a high of 69 percent in 1968 to a low of 65 percent
in 1975. The most variable component of this tradedwealth is
household holdings of corporate equities which fell from nearly
23 percent of total wealth in 1968 to only 9.5 percentin 1979.
The rapid decline in the holding of corporate equity wasoffset— 29—
byincreased holding of real estate. Non-residential real
estate peaked at 39.4 percent of household wealth in 1979, up
from a low of 28 percent at the beginning of the period being
studied.
Due to this variation in the components of personal wealth
over time, we apportioned household wealth among the six income
groups studied on a component by component basis. Each
component was allocated according to the distribution of income
reported on tax returns likely to flow from that component of
household wealth. For example, the distribution of corporate
equities in a given year was assumed to be the same as the
distribution of dividends in that year. The sum of net rental
income and net rental loss was used to apportion real estate
wealth. Non—corporate business wealth was apportioned by
summing net profits and net losses from proprietorships,
partnerships, and small business corporations.
The key advantage of this apportioning technique was that
the shares of wealth were determined from the same data base as
the data on the level and distribution of capital gains
realizations, Observations on individual income classes in each
year were therefore independent of observations from other
years. Capital gains income was excluded from the apportionment
process to avoid simultaneity. At the same time, the aggregate
level of wealth was determined independently of the data on
capital gains realizations. Table 8 presents the level of
tradeable wealth for each income class in each year of the
period studied.TABLE 7
Realizations by Asset Type —j9774
Percent of Percent of
Transaction Gains
INCLUDED
Corporate Stock 42.1 14.7
Distributions from
Partnerships, etc. 10.7 14.1
Business Real Estate 2.6 9.2
Business Non—Real Est. 8.8 10.4
Personal Residence 6.5 14.9
Non—Business Real Est. 3.2 9.5
Installment Sales 3.3 8.5
EXCLUDED
Commodities 1.3 0.1
Retirement Distribution 0.4 0.7
I NDE TERMINANT 21 .1 17 .9TABLE 8
Tradeable Wealth by Income Class
___________________ IncomeClass _________________
under $50,000— $100,000—$200,000— $500,000 over
Year $50L000$100000200000 00, 000 ____QLQ.Q
1965 1493 162 72 42 14 20
1966 1545 178 80 46 16 20
1967 1619 200 93 54 20 23
1968 1766 242 120 69 25 29
1969 1864 266 130 72 25 30
1970 1907 280 127 68 23 28
1971 2036 313 140 75 25 29
1972 2196 358 167 89 30 33
1973 2307 395 186 95 30 31
1974 2403 419 194 93 28 25
1975 2555 471 219 105 31 29
1976 2806 557 264 129 38 36
1977 3090 654 310 155 45 42
1978 3459 791 381 193 56 47
1979 3877 977 485 255 75 67
1980 4271 1204 617 338 106 108
1981 4659 1378 714 397 127 131
1982 4958 1455 771 455 155 161— 30—
Onepotential criticism of this approach is the allocation
of corporate equity on the basis of dividends received. If
clientele effects exist which are based on tax rates, this
approach would tend to underestimate the value of corporate
equities held by upper income groups since these groups keep a
smaller portion of their dividends after tax relative to capital
gains, than do other goups. However, an upward revaluation of
wealth in upper income groups to reflect this possibility would
put downward pressure on the realizations to wealth ratio among
taxpayer groups with high marginal tax rates. This would in turn
suggest a greater impact of capital gains tax rates on
realizations. We elected to ignore possible clientele effects
in order to err on the side of conservatism in estimating the
effects of capital gains tax rates.
The flow of funds data also includes reconciliation
statements which explain the change in sectoral asset holdings
from year to year. Holdings of a particular asset could vary
for one of two reasons: net purchases or sales of the asset by
the household sector or a change in the price of the existing
stock of holdings. This latter effect is termed "revaluation."
and for purposes of this study was used as a measure of
unrealized capital gains on assets held by households.
We allocated the revaluation of each asset in the same
manner as the stock of wealth held in that asset. Revaluation
values were computed for holding periods up to seven years.
These were converted into inflation adjusted terms by increasing
the nominal value of the asset held at the beginning of the— 31—
revaluationperiod to reflect prices at the end of the
revaluation period. A real value was obtained by subtracting
this from what the value of the assets held at the end of the
revaluation would have been if no net purchases had been made.
In practice, revaluation periods over one year turned out not to
be significant in estimating the level of capital gains. The
data suggested that much of these multi-year revaluations was
picked up in the value of wealth.
Non-traded Wealth
Non—traded wealth was comprised mainly of cash, interest
bearing financial assets, and life insurance and pension fund
reserves. Over the period being studied, pension and life
insurance reserves remained a roughly constant share of
household wealth at about 11 percent. Cash and checking
accounts declined from a bit over 3 percent of wealth to a bit
under 3 percent. Interest bearing financial assets tended to
absorb any fluctuations in the share of non—traded wealth in
total wealth.
As in the case of traded assets, we allocated these
non—tradeable assets on a component by component basis as well.
Cash and checking accounts were allocated in proportion to
Adjusted Gross Income. Interest bearing financial assets were
allocated in proportion to interest income. Pension and life
insurance reserves were allocated in proportion to the sum of
interest and dividend income.— 32—
Again,the key advantage of this apportioning technique was
that the shares of wealth were determined from the same data
base as the level and distribution of capital gains.
Independence of observations for individual income classes in
each year was maintained. And, the aggregate level of wealth
was determined independently of the data on capital gains
realizations.
No revaluations of non—traded assets was necessary.
Revaluation of cash, checking, and saving deposits is
impossible. The flow of funds accounts do not provide
revaluations for any interest bearing assets, maintaining each
priced at par. Although some degree of revaluation may actually
have occurred due to fluctuating interest rates, it is likely to
have been quite small. All credit market instruments comprised
only 9 percent of of total financial assets in 1982. This
included short duration assets such as commercial paper on which
no capital gain or loss was likely.
The next section uses this data on the level and
distribution of household wealth in estimating the determinants
of capital gains realizations. Wealth and revaluation values
for given years were obtained by averaging the values at the
beginning and at the end of the year. All of the values f or
wealth and revaluations were converted into real terms using the
average value of the GNP deflator for the year in question.— 33—
III.Cita 1 GainsRates Rea]. izations andRevenues
The precedingtwo sections described the derivation of data
oncapital gains tax rates, realizations, and the level and
distributionof personal wealth. The objective of this section
is to estimate the effect of tax rates on capital gains
realizations and therefore on capital gains revenues.
The basic regression equation we estimate is:
(3)ln LTG1 = + MTR1
+B2 inTRD11 +
inNTRD1+ l3 in REV1 +
Ineach case the subscript j represents one of the 6 income
classes and the subscript i represents one of the 18 years being
studied. LTG represents net long term gains deflated by the GNP
deflator where 1972 is valued at 100. MTR is the average
marginal tax rate on net long term gains. TRD represents the
real value of tradeabie wealth. NTRD is the real value of
wealth which is not readily traded. REV represents the
revaluation of assets during the year i expressed in terms of
1972 prices. In the case of the wealth variables mid—year
values were used. These were obtained by taking an average of
end of year and beginning of year values.— 34—
Theresults of ordinary least squares regression of the data
on the model described by equation 3 were:






All four coefficients were significant except for the itercept
term which was not significantly different from zero. The
adjusted R square value for the regression was 0.8825.
The value for the tax rate parameter should be interpretted
as saying that a one percentage point increase in the marginal
tax rate produces a 6.2 percent decline in the level of long
term capital gains realizations. This represents a semi—
elasticity format, not a pure elasticity.
The parameter for tradeable wealth should be interpretted as
an elasticity. A one percent higher level of tradeablewealth
implies a 1.1 percent level of long term gains realizations.
The parameter estimate is within one standard error of a value
of unity. In the absence of tax effects, and short term market
fluctuations, a value of unity would be expected.
The parameter for non—traded wealth should also be
interpretted as an elasticity. In this case, a one percent— 35—
increasein non—traded wealth decreases net long term capital
gains realizations by 0.87 percent. A negative value on this
parameter can be understood in the context of what comprises
non-traded wealth. A substantial portion of this wealth
represents highly liquid assets such as cash, savings and
checking deposits, and government securities. If long term
capital gains realizations are designed to raise cash for
consumption purposes, we would expect to see realizations
negatively correlated with the existing level of these liquid
assets.
The final parameter value also represents an elasticity. A
one percent increase in the revaluation of traded assets in a
given year increases net capital gains realizations by 0.3
percent. This parameter suggests that increases in stock,
business, or real estate prices prompt increased realizations.
Note that this is in addition to the increase in realizations
due to a higher level of wealth. So, for example, in a year in
which there is a 20 percent rise in the value of traded assets
we could expect capital gains realizations to be higher by a
total of about 28 percent, 22 percent due to the higher level of
wealth and 6 percent due to the price increases in that year.
If prices remained stable in later years, capital gains
realizations would fall 6 percent in the following year to
maintain a new, permanent level of gains 22 percent higher than
the initial level.
Before exploring the robustness of these results, consider
an additional interpretation for the tax rate parameter. In— 36—
thecase of a single tax rate, capital gains tax receipts are
the product of the capital gains tax rate and capital gains
realizations. Capital gains tax revenues are maximized when a
given percent increase in the capital gains tax rate just
offsets an equal percentage decline in realizations resulting
from the highest rate.
In the context of the parameters estimated in equation 3,
revenue maximization occurs when the capital gains tax rate
times the tax rate parameter, 31, equals negative unity. The
revenue maximizing capital gains tax rate implied by the results
of the regression is 16.1 percent. The range of revenue
maximizing tax rates within one standard error of the estimate
goes from 14.3 percent to 18.5 percent. This range is below the
current top capital gains tax rate of 20 percent. Other
specifications presented below support this general conclusion.
It should be noted that there is nothing "optimal" in the
sense about a tax rate at a revenue maximizing level. All tax
rates above this level are simply counterproductive from the
view of raising revenue. Stated differently, the shadow price
of raising additional revenue at this top tax rate is infinite.
Only tax rates below this revenue maximizing point are within
the possible range of optimality.
The robustness of this result can be examined by considering
the effect of changing the specification of the regression
equation. Tests of alternatives were therefore carried out.
Equation 4 drops the variable representing revaluations of
traded assets.— 37—
(4)in LTG =0.874-7.394MTR +1.246in TRD -0.971in NTRD
(0.397) (0.750) (0.104) (0.088)
Standard errors are in parantheses below the parameter
estimates. The adjusted R—square for this regression is
0.8693. The standard errors show that each coefficient is
statistically significant.
In this case, the parameter value for the marginal tax rate
term is increased to 7.39. This implies a revenue maximizing
marginal tax rate on capital gains of 13.5 percent. Much of
the effect of the dropping of the gains parameter appears to
have been picked up in the traded wealth parameter, as we would
expect.
The effect of dropping the non-traded wealth term moves the
tax rate parameter in the opposite direction as equation 5
shows:
(5) ln LTG =—0.282—5.076MTR +0.124TRD +0.564REV
(0.715) (1.077) (0.053) (0.110)
All parameter estimates except for the intercept remain
significant, but the R—square value for this regression drops to
0.775. This suggests that non-traded wealth contributes to the
regression specification. The parameter on the tax rate
variable implies a revenue maximizing capital gains tax rate
almost exactly equal to the current 20 percent level.— 38—
Droppingboth the non-traded assets variable and the
revaluation variable produces a result indicated by equation 6.
(6) in LTG =2.468—7.326MTR +0.191TRD
(0.543) (1.097) (0.058)
Again, the parameter estimates are significant, but the R—square
term fails to 0.720. The parameter estimate for the tax rate
term resembles that for equation 4 when the revaluation term was
also dropped. This reinforces the relationship between declines
in capital gains tax rates and upward revaluations of the prices
of stocks, real estate, and non—corporate businesses.
A further specification was run which did not differentiate
between the form of wealth holding. The results, shown in
equation 7 reinforce the usefulness of separating wealth into
traded and non—traded components.
(7) in LTG =—0.267—5.133MTR +0.115WEALTH +0.565REV
(0.724) (1.092) (0.054) (0.111)
The R—square for this specification was 0.773. The parameters
remain significant although the wealth term shows a lower t
statistic than in the specifications where traded and non-traded
wealth are run separately. Again, the marginal tax rate
parameter implies a revenue maximizing capital gains rate of
about 20 percent.— 39—
Whenrevaluations are dropped from the specification shown
in equation 7, the parameter estimate on the tax rate term again
rises to a value in excess of 7.
(8) In LTG =2.369—7.302MTR +0.186WEALTH
(0.566) (1.120) (0.057)
The R-square value for this regression is 0.719. Again, the
parameter estimate for the tax rate coefficient resembles thatin
other cases where the revaluation term is dropped. The marginal
tax rate parameter is little affected by the specification of
the wealth term, however, as long as all of the values for
wealth are included in the regression in some fashion.
A further check on the specification involves running dummy
variables for each year in the period 1966-1982 to see if any
particular years are causing the results. The results of the
basic specification (Equation 1) run with annual dummy variables
is presented below:
(9) In LTG =2.252-6.849MTR +0.033TRD +0.228NTRD
(0.585) (0.890) (0.116) (0.118)
-0.231 REV +DUMMIES
(0 .093)— 40—
Thecoefficients on the dummy variables were significant,
and illustrated an underlying time trend reflecting the rising
levels of long term gains over the period. Inclusion of these
annual data reduced the significance of the wealth and
revaluation coefficients as variations in these terms were
captured on a year—by--year basis. However, the marginal tax
rate coefficient remained highly significant, and increased in
value relative to the basic specification.
Another specification of the regression is obtained by
changing the tax rate coefficient into an elasticity format. In
this case, the natural log of the portion of the gain which the
taxpayer is allowed to keep becomes the tax parameter. This
specification presumes that a given percentage point reduction
in the tax rate, or a given percent reduction in the same value,
will have an effect which varies with the level of the tax rate.
For example, a reduction in the capital gains tax rate from
25 to 24 percent implies an increase in the share of the gain
the taxpayer keeps from 75 to 76 percent. That represents a
1.33 percent increase in the share kept by the taxpayer. The
same one percentage point reduction in tax rate from 50 to 49
would increase the taxpayer's share from 50 to 51 percent of the
gain, or by 2 percent. Similarly, a 4 percent reduction in the
tax rate, from 25 to 24, and from 50 to 48, would imply a
percent change in the after tax share far greater at the higher
tax rate (3 times as much) as at the lower tax rate.
The results of such a specification are presented by
equation 10.— 41—
(10)in LTG =—20.510+4.253in (1—MTR) ÷ 1.084 in TRD
(2.301) (0.587) (0.110)
—0.843in NTRD +0.346in REV
0.091) (0.085)
Again, au of the parameter vaiues are significant at a high
level of confidence. The R—square value for this regression is
0.875, suggesting a nearly equal degree of explanation as the
original specification in equation 3. The parameter values for
the wealth and revaluation terms are also quite similar to those
of equation 3. The addition of annual dummies raises the R -
squareterm to 0.951.
The parameter estimate for the tax rate term requires
reinterpretation. In this case, lower marginal tax rates
increase the after tax share. So, the positive coefficient
again suggests a higher level of realizations when tax rates are
reduced. The revenue maximizing capital gains tax rate can be
obtained by dividing unity by unity plus the tax rate
coefficient. In this case, a revenue maximizing capital gains
tax rate of 19.0 percent is implied.
We would expect a higher revenue maximizing rate to be
implied by this specification as a given percentage point
reduction has a greater effect on the tax rate variable in high
tax rate observations than in low tax rate observations. Still,
the revenue maximizing rate is slightly below the current 20
percent level.— 42—
Afinal specification of these equations was performed which
included a variable for the change in the capital gains tax rate
from the preceding year. If capital gains tax rates are
suddenly reduced, we might expect a rush to realize gains which
were not profitable to realize in earlier years with higher
rates. This is known as the temporary "unlocking" phenomenon.
The term DMTR represents the difference between the current
year's marginal tax rate and the preceding year's marginal tax
rate.If the tax rate was lower in the current year, a negative
value would result for DMTR. As we would expect a lower tax
rate to increase realizations, a negative coefficient for DMTR
is implied. Equation 11 indicates that this is the case.
ln LTG =-0.713—5.391MTR +1.030TRD -0.781NTRD
(0.533) (0.868) (0.110) (0.097)
+0.327REV -3.027DMTR
(0.084) (1.469)
The results suggest that temporary unlocking contributes to
the behavioral response to lower tax rates, thus enhancing
revenue at lower rates. This implies that the permanent revenue
maximizing rate is higher than that implied by the earlier
equations. The coefficient of 5.39 implies a revenue maximizing
marginal tax rate of 18.5 percent, higher than implied by the
initial specification but lower than the current rate of 20
percent.— 43—
Inconclusion, these data suggest a high degree of
sensitivity of capital gains realizations to the tax rate
imposed on such gains. The revenue maximizing tax rate implied
by these findings is at or below the current 20 percent level.
This result is robust to the specification of the regression
equation.
It is important to bear in mind the plausibility of this
result in contrast to most findings about revenue maximizing tax
rates. Taxed commodities such as labor supply will show
relatively little response to marginal tax rate reductions
because a relatively high proportion of the maximum possible
level of supply is in the market. By contrast, only a very
small fraction of existing capital gains are realized in a given
year.
For example, total capital gains realized in 1982 amounted
to a record $86.1 billion. But, the revaluation in personally
held traded assets during that year alone was $305.7 billion
implying that only 28.2 percent of that year's gains were
realized. By contrast, in the high tax year of 1978, total
realized gains were $48.6 billion out of revaluations during
that year of $693.9 billion. Only 7 percent of the increase in
value in traded assets in that year was represented by realized
gains.(Of course, in both years the stock of accumulated
capital gains was enormous compared to realizations.)
Clearly the potential for increased capital gains
realizations and revenues was substantial in 1978. The taxation
of gains at the time of realization rather than at the time of
receipt makes capital gains far more tax rate sensitive than
other forms of income.Footnotes
1. See for example the Department of Treasury's report to the
Congress on the capital gains tax reductions of 1978, p.35.
A similar statement appears in the description of the
alternative tax computation in the Statistics of Income 1966,
p.164, "The effect of this computation was a maximum tax of 25
percent on net long—term capital gain."
2. This data was derived from the Statistics of Income 1966,
p.94.
3. This data is presented in Table 3B of the Statistics of
Income 1976, p. 83.
4. Table 7 was calculated from Table 1.9 of the Department of
Treasury's report to the Congress on the capital gains tax
reductions of 1978, pp.18—i9.Bibliography
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